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Case No. 20080892-CA 
IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
Jesus A. Jimenez, 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
Brief of Appellee 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals from convictions for murder and aggravated robbery, both 
first degree felonies. This Court has jurisdiction under the pour-over provision of 
Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(j) (West Supp. 2008). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Did the trial court plainly err for not sua sponte dismissing the aggravated 
robbery charges at the close of the State's case-in-chief, where no settled appellate 
law requires that an accomplice know that the principal possesses or intends to use 
a dangerous weapon? 
Standard of Review. To establish plain error, a defendant must demonstrate 
that "(i) an error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and 
(iii) the error is harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a 
more favorable outcome." State v. Lee, 2006 UT 5, \ 26,128 P.2d 1179 (citation and 
internal quotation omitted). If, however, by his counsel's affirmative 
representations, Defendant invited any error, plain error review does not lie. Id. at 
116. 
2. Did defense counsel perform ineffectively for not moving to dismiss the 
aggravated robbery charge at the close of the State's case-in-chief, where no settled 
appellate law requires evidence that an accomplice know that the principal 
possesses or intends to use a dangerous weapon? 
Standard of Review. " An ineffective assistance of counsel claim raised for the 
first time on appeal presents a question of law/' reviewable for correctness. See State 
v. Clark, 2004 UT 25, f 6, 89 P.3d 162. 
3. Should this Court review for manifest injustice Defendant's claim that the 
trial court improperly instructed the jury on the dangerous weapon enhancement, 
where Defendant, through counsel, affirmatively represented below that he had no 
objection to the instructions? 
Standard of Review. No standard of review applies to this issue. 
4. Was defense counsel ineffective for not objecting to the dangerous weapon 
enhancement jury instructions? 
Standard of Review. See standard of review for issue 2, above. 
2 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUSES, AND RULES 
The following relevant statutes are included in Addendum A: 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-202 (West 2004); 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.8 (West 2004); 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (West Supp. 2007); 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-301 (West 2004); 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (West 2004). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASf 
The State charged Defendant, Jesus Jimenez, as a party to the offenses, with 
one count of murder, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 
(West Supp. 2007), and one count of aggravated robbery, a first degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (West 2004). Rl-3. The State also charged 
Defendant with use of a dangerous weapon in the commission of the aggravated 
robbery and sought an enhanced penalty under Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.8 (West 
2004). Id. 
A jury trial was held. R76-79. After the State rested, Defendant's trial counsel 
moved to dismiss, arguing that the State had not presented sufficient evidence to 
support a finding that Defendant, who drove Miguel Mateos to and from the 
robbery site, knew that Miguel intended to commit a robbery. See R78, R149:8. The 
court asked, "Do you believe that they have to show prior knowledge that he had a 
gun on him?" R149:8. Counsel answered, "No, just that he was going in . . . [to] 
commit a robbery." Id. Noting testimony that Defendant had driven repeatedly 
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past the salon, slowed down as he went by, and — after dropping Miguel at the 
site — told his girlfriend, Cassandra Matern, that she had better get down, the trial 
court reasoned that a jury could reasonably infer that Defendant knew that he was 
helping Miguel commit a robbery. Id. The court therefore denied the motion. Id. 
Before closing argument, the trial court asked both counsel, "You have no 
objection to the instructions?" R149:25. Both said that they did not. Id. 
The jury returned guilty verdicts on both counts and found that Defendant 
was subject to the enhanced penalty. R79. The trial court sentenced Defendant to 
an indeterminate prison term of fifteen years to life on his murder conviction and to 
a consecutive enhanced prison term of six years to life on his aggravated robbery 
conviction. R131-32. 
Defendant timely appealed. R136. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On August 15,2007, Defendant and Cassandra Matern picked up Miguel, also 
known as Toker, in Rose Park. R148:57,59. Defendant was driving his green Honda 
Accord. R148:61; see also R148:40. The group drove to The Shop, a beauty salon near 
the intersection of California Avenue and Navajo Street in Salt Lake City. R148:62; 
see also R148:20-21. They first passed the salon heading west on California, then 
flipped around and traveled back east, and then went west again. R148:62-63. They 
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then turned onto Navajo heading south, flipped north, and then flipped south again. 
R148:63. In all, they drove past the salon about five times. R148:64. 
Twelve-year-old Laura Hernandez, whose sister Faviola ran the salon, was 
playing with her little brother, Junior, at a school playground nearby. R148:34-35. 
They saw a green car pass the salon several times. R148:36-37. Each time the car 
passed the salon, the driver slowed down and then stepped on the gas. R148:37-38. 
Inside the car, Defendant and Miguel were speaking in Spanish. R148:64. 
Cassandra, who spoke only a little Spanish, did not understand very much of their 
conversation. R148:64-65. About the third time they passed the salon, Cassandra 
became suspicious. R148:66. They finally stopped south of the salon, Miguel got 
out, Defendant flipped the car around, and Defendant repeatedly told Cassandra 
that she had "better get down." R148:66-68. 
Miguel entered the salon. R148:22. Faviola Hernandez, the salon operator, 
was inside with a customer, Leonel Hernandez, and L^ura and Junior, who had 
come in from the playground. R148:21-23. Miguel asked for money and pointed a 
gun at Leonel, telling him to get onto the ground. R148:22. He told Laura and 
Junior to get on the floor. R148: 47. When Laura looked up, he pointed the gun at 
them. Id. Faviola said, "No. No, not the kids." Id. 
Miguel asked for Leonel's wallet, and he repeatedly asked Faviola for money. 
R148:22-23. Leonel began getting the money out of his wallet and told Faviola to 
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give Miguel her money. R148:25. Faviola went into the back of the salon and came 
back with the gun that she kept for protection. R148:25, 43. Leonel then heard a 
gunshot. R148:25. Miguel ran out. Id. Inside, Leonel locked the door, saw blood 
coming from Faviola's chest, called 911, and tried to administer aid. R148:27. 
Outside, Cassandra also heard the gunshot. R148:68. She told Defendant to 
leave, but Defendant refused. Id. Miguel, running out of the salon, got into the back 
seat, and Defendant drove away. R148:69. 
Defendant, Cassandra, and Miguel drove to a Wal-Mart, where Defendant 
and Miguel hid the gun behind the stereo in Defendant's car and Miguel changed 
his shirt. R148:69-70. The three of them had dinner, and Defendant and Cassandra 
then took Miguel home. R148:70-71. 
Faviola died at the salon. R148:136-37. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. Defendant cannot prevail on his claim that the trial court plainly erred for 
not sua sponte dismissing the aggravated robbery charge for lack of evidence that 
Defendant knew about a gun. First, there is another unchallenged basis to support 
the trial court's submission of the charge to the jury. Under the law, the instructions 
given the jury, and the evidence presented, the jury could have found aggravated 
robbery not just based on the use of a gun, but also based on the serious bodily 
injury suffered by the victim. Defendant has not challenged the second basis for the 
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trial court's submitting the charge, and this Court may therefore affirm without 
reviewing Defendant's gun claim. This Court may also affirm without reviewing 
Defendant's claim on the merits because Defendant invited the alleged error below. 
In any event, Defendant cannot prevail on his claum. First, Defendant has not 
marshaled the evidence supporting a finding that he did, in fact, know that Miguel, 
the principal, had a gun. And even if Defendant were excused from marshaling, he 
could not prevail because he cannot show that error, if any, was obvious, where no 
settled appellate law requires that a party to aggravated robbery know that a gun is 
present. Next, despite Defendant's claims to the contrary, the evidence sufficed to 
support a finding that he did know that Miguel was parrying the gun and still 
intentionally aided him in committing the robbery. Finally, Defendant has not 
shown harm. Even had Defendant prevailed on his claim that a party's conviction 
of aggravated robbery requires knowledge of a gun, an4 even had he prevailed on 
his claim that the evidence was insufficient to show that \ie knew Miguel had a gun, 
the aggravated robbery count would still have gone to the jury. An alternative basis 
existed for establishing aggravated robbery, i.e., the causing of serious bodily injury. 
The evidence was not only sufficient, but undisputed and overwhelming, as to that 
matter. Defendant therefore cannot show the likelihood of a more favorable result 
an the aggravated robbery count. 
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2. Trial counsel did not perform ineffectively for not challenging the 
sufficiency of the evidence to establish aggravated robbery and for not moving to 
dismiss that charge. First, a reasonable strategy existed for counsel's attacking the 
sufficiency of the evidence to show Defendant's knowledge that Miguel was going 
to commit a robbery, rather than his knowledge that Miguel had a gun. Had 
counsel succeeded in challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to show that 
Defendant knew that Miguel intended a robbery, Defendant could not have been 
convicted of either aggravated robbery or felony murder. Had he succeeded in 
convincing the trial court that the evidence was insufficient to show that he knew 
Miguel had a gun, Defendant's aggravated robbery charge would still have gone to 
the jury on the serious bodily injury basis and, given the overwhelming evidence 
that Faviola suffered serious bodily injury, he would have still been convicted as a 
party both to aggravated robbery and to felony murder. Moreover, counsel was not 
deficient in not moving to dismiss for Defendant's alleged lack of knowledge about 
the gun where no settled appellate law required that knowledge. In addition, 
Defendant has not marshaled the evidence to demonstrate the he did, indeed, know 
about the gun. That evidence was sufficient. Finally, Defendant has not shown 
prejudice because, as explained above, even had counsel convinced the trial court 
that knowledge of a gun was necessary and that Defendant did not have that 
knowledge, the aggravated robbery charge would still have gone to the jury on the 
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basis of the serious bodily injury that occurred. Again, evidence as to that injury 
was overwhelming and undisputed, and Defendant cannot show a reasonable 
probability that the aggravated robbery verdict would have been different, had 
counsel moved to dismiss the aggravated robbery charge for lack of evidence that he 
knew about Miguel's gun. 
3. Defendant cannot prevail on his claim that the trial court improperly 
instructed the jury on the elements of the dangerous weapon enhancement and that 
the improper instructions resulted in manifest injustice. Defendant cannot prevail 
because he invited any error below, and review for plain error therefore does not lie. 
4. Defendant cannot establish ineffective assistance of counsel based on 
counsel's not objecting to the dangerous weapon enhancement instruction. 
Defendant has not demonstrated prejudice, where the evidence demonstrated that, 
during the commission of the robbery, he knew that a dangerous weapon was 
present and still intentionally aided Miguel. 
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ARGUMENT 
Defendant was convicted as a party to aggravated robbery and felony 
murder. R131. On appeal, Defendant claims that the trial court plainly erred for 
not sua sponte dismissing his aggravated robbery conviction, alleging that the 
evidence did not show that he knew the principal possessed a gun. See Br. 
Appellant 39-41. He further claims that counsel was ineffective for not moving 
to dismiss the aggravated robbery for the alleged lack of such evidence. See id. at 
22-39. He also claims that the trial court's instruction on the enhancement for use 
of a deadly weapon resulted in manifest injustice, see id. at 46, and that trial 
counsel was ineffective for not challenging the instruction. See id. at 39. 
Except for one cursory sentence, Defendant does not challenge his felony 
murder conviction. See id. at 39. That claim is inadequately briefed, and this 
Court should not review it.1 
]Rule 24(a)(9) requires an appellant to provide developed argument 
containing "the contentions and reasons. . . with respect to the tissues presented. . . 
with citations to authorities, statutes, and the parts of the record relied on." Utah 
appellate courts also have cautioned that an appellant cannot make the court into 
"'a depository in which [the appellant] may dump the burden of argument and 
research7" Allen v. Friel, 2008 UT 56, f 9,194 P.3d 903 (quoting Smith v. Four Cornors 
Mental Health Ctr., Inc., 2003 UT 23, \ 46, 70 P.3d 904). When an appellant fails to 
(Footnote continues on following page.) 
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I. 
(Response to Defendant's Point It) 
THIS COURT SHOULD NOT REVIEW DEFENDANTS PLAIN 
ERROR CLAIM, WHERE DEFENDANT HAS CHALLENGED 
ONLY ONE OF TWO ALTERNATIVE BASES FOR 
SUBMITTING THE AGGRAVATED ROBBERY CHARGE TO 
THE JURY AND WHERE HE INVITED ANY ERROR BELOW; IN 
ANY CASE, HE HAS NOT DEMONSTRATED PLAIN ERROR 
Defendant claims that the trial court plainly erred for not sua sponte 
dismissing the aggravated robbery charge. See Br. Appellant at 39-41. He argues 
that the evidence was obviously insufficient to show that he knew that Miguel 
Mateos, the principal, had a gun. See id. at 40. This Court should not review this 
claim because Defendant has not challenged the sufficiency of the evidence to 
support a conviction of aggravated robbery on the alternative ground that the 
robbery resulted in serious bodily injury, including the death of the victim. 
Moreover, Defendant invited any error below. In any event, Defendant cannot 
show that any error was obvious or that it was harmful, 
comply with rule 24's briefing requirement, summary rejection of his appeal is 
justified. See State v. Green, 2004 UT 76, \ 11, 99 P.3d 820 (citing rule 24(j)). 
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A. This Court need not address Defendant's plain error claim 
where another unchallenged basis survives to support the trial 
court's sending the aggravated robbery charge to the jury. 
Defendant claims that the trial court erred for not sua sponte dismissing the 
aggravated robbery charge because the evidence was insufficient to support a 
finding that he knew about the gun and therefore that he was guilty as a party to 
aggravated robbery. Br. Appellant at 39-41. Defendant cannot prevail on this claim 
where he has not challenged an alternative basis to support the trial court's 
submitting the aggravated robbery charge to the jury. 
Relevant law. When challenging a court's decision on appeal, a defendant 
"must address a]l of the circumstances upon which the court's decision was based/' 
State v. Montiel, 2004 UT App 242, t 20,95 P.3d 1216, ajfd, 2005 UT 48,122 P.3d 571. 
When the defendant challenges only some of those bases, this Court "need not 
address whether the trial court erred in considering th[ose] bas[e]s" because the 
other bases survive to support the trial court's decision. State v. Baker, 963 P.2d 801, 
810 (Utah App. 1998); see also Andersen v. Professional Escrow Services, Inc., 118 P.3d 
75, 78 (Idaho 2005) (appellants' failure to challenge on appeal trial court's 
alternative grounds requires dismissal of their case); Greenwood v. Blackjack Cattle 
Co., 464 P.2d 281,283 (Kan. 1970) (when trial court's decision is based on alternative 
grounds, appellant's failure to challenge all grounds on appeal "renders 
unnecessary" a decision on the issue that is raised); San Antonio Press, Inc. v. Custom 
12 
Bilt Machinery, 852 S.W.2d 64, 65 (Tex. App. 1993) (where an alternative ground 
supporting a judgment is not challenged on appeal, the appellate court must affirm; 
otherwise, "an appellant could avoid the adverse effect of a separate and 
independent basis for the judgment by ignoring it and leaving it unchallenged"); 5 
Am. Jur. 2d Appellate Review § 775 ("[W]here a separate and independent ground 
from the one appealed supports the judgment made below, and is not challenged on 
appeal, the appellate court must affirm/') (citing cases). 
Analysis. Defendant does not claim that the evidence was insufficient to 
support a finding of robbery. See Br. Appellant at 37 ("While there may have been 
evidence indicating that Jimenez intended to aid in the underlying robbery, there 
was no evidence indicating he intended the use of a weapon "). He only claims 
that the evidence was insufficient to show that he knew that Miguel, the principal, 
had a gun and therefore was insufficient to support a finding that Defendant was a 
party to aggravated robbery. Br. Appellant at 23-36, 40. This Court need not 
address Defendant's claim that the trial court plainly erred for not sua sponte 
dismissing the aggravated robbery charge for the alleged lack of evidence that 
Defendant knew about the gun, as Defendant has not challenged another basis to 
support the trial court's decision. 
A defendant may be convicted of aggravated robbery under three different 
bases: if in the course of committing robbery, he "uses or threatens to use a 
13 
dangerous weapon" or "causes serious bodily upon another" or "takes or attempts 
to take an operable motor vehicle." Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-302. Here, the jury was 
instructed that they could find Defendant guilty of aggravated robbery based on 
either of the first two alternatives — use of a weapon or causing serious bodily injury. 
See R117. 
Defendant claims that the evidence was insufficient to show that he knew that 
Miguel, the principal, had a gun. Br. Appellant at 24-26. He claims that, absent such 
knowledge, he cannot be convicted as a party to an aggravated robbery simply 
because a gun is used. See id. But he does not challenge the sufficiency of the 
evidence to show that the victim suffered serious bodily injury and death during the 
robbery. See id. Nor does he argue that he cannot be convicted as a party to 
aggravated robbery based on the serious injury that occurred. See id. Thus, he has 
not challenged a surviving alternative basis for the trial court's not sua sponte 
dismissing his aggravated robbery charge, and this Court need not address his claim 
of error. 
B. Plain error review does not lie because Defendant invited any 
error. 
Moreover, this Court should not review Defendant's plain error claim where 
Defendant invited the alleged error below. 
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Relevant law. To obtain appellate review, a party ordinarily must first raise 
the issue in the trial court. Pratt v. Nelson, 2007 UT 41, f 15, 164 P.3d 366. To 
preserve an issue for appeal, the objection must be timely, specific, and supported 
by evidence or relevant legal authority. Id. This rule is "based on the premise that, 
'in the interest of orderly procedure, the trial court ought to be given an opportunity 
to address a claimed error and, if appropriate, correct it.'" Id. (quoting State v. Cruz, 
2005 UT 45, \ 33, 122 P.3d 543). While an appellate court may review an 
unpreserved claim for plain error or manifest injustice, it will do so only if the 
appellant argues that plain error or exceptional circumstances justifies review. Id. at 
16. 
But this Court has consistently held that invited error precludes even plain 
error review. See Pratt, 2007 UT 41, If 16; State v. Winfield, 2006 UT 4, If 14,128 P.3d 
1171; State v. Hamilton, 2003 UT 22, If 54, 70 P.3d 111; State v. Pinder, 2005 UT 15, 
If 62,114 P.3d 551; State v. Geukgeuzian, 2004 UT 16, ^ 9, 86 P.3d 742. Under the 
invited error doctrine, the appellate courts will not engage in plain error review 
when "counsel, either by statement or act, affirmatively represented to the [trial] 
court that he or she had no objection to the [proceedings].'" Pratt, 2007 UT 41, f 16 
(quoting Winfield, 2006 UT 4,114). 
The invited error doctrine "'arises from the principle that a party cannot take 
advantage of an error committed at trial when that party led the trial court into 
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committing the error.'" Id. (quoting Winfield, 2006 UT 4, ^ 15). It recognizes that 
parties are "not entitled to both the benefit of not objecting at trial and the benefit of 
objecting on appeal." Id. at f^ 17 (citation and internal quotation omitted). It 
discourages parties "from intentionally misleading the trial court so as to preserve a 
hidden ground for reversal on appeal." Id. It is "designed to . . . inhibit a defendant 
from foregoing . . . an objection with the strategy of enhancing the defendant's 
chances of acquittal and then, if that strategy fails,.. . claiming on appeal that the 
court should reverse." Id. at f^ 17 n.18 (citations and internal quotation omitted). 
Proceedings below. Defense counsel moved to dismiss at the close of the 
State's case-in-chief. R149:8. Defense counsel claimed that the evidence was 
insufficient to support the conviction. Id. She stated, "The evidence is . . . that 
everyone has identified the person who killed [Faviola] as someone by the name of 
Miguel Mateos. And I don't believe that they've met their burden of showing that 
[Defendant] knew that Mr. Mateos was going in with a gun to do a robbery and in 
the course of that robbery ended up killing someone." Id. 
Trying to flesh out counsel's claim, the trial court questioned, "Do you believe 
that they have to show prior knowledge that [Miguel] had a gun on him?" Id. 
Defense counsel said, "No, just that he was going in . . . [to] [cjommit a robbery." Id. 
Thus, in clarifying that her claim was that the evidence was insufficient to 
show that Defendant knew anything at all about Miguel's plans to commit a 
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robbery, counsel affirmatively represented to the court that the law did not require 
that Defendant have knowledge that a gun would be usied. Id. 
Analysis, Defendant did not preserve this claitn below. The trial court 
received no notice that Defendant was claiming that the court should grant his 
motion to dismiss because he did not know about the gun. Defense counsel 
specifically told the trial court that she was challenging the sufficiency of the 
evidence to show that Defendant knew that Miguel planned to commit a robbery. 
See R149:8. 
Moreover, Defendant's argument stopped the trial court from addressing the 
very issue he is now pressing on appeal and "led the trial court into committing the 
[alleged] error." Pratt, 2007 UT 41, f 16 (quoting Winfield, 2006 UT 4, ^ 15); see also 
R149:8. Had Defendant not stopped the trial court from addressing that issue, had 
the trial court addressed that discrete issue, and had the trial court agreed that 
Defendant, as a party, had to know about the gun, the trial court would still have 
denied Defendant's motion to dismiss and would have sent the aggravated robbery 
charge to the jury on the alternative ground that the aggravated robbery had 
resulted in serious bodily injury. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 ("A person 
commits aggravated robbery if in the course of committing a robbery, he . . . uses of 
threatens to use a dangerous weapon.. . [or] causes serious bodily injury upon 
another."). 
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Defendant's invited error is a classic example of someone "trying to have his 
cake and eat it too/' It precludes review of his claim on appeal. 
C. The trial court did not plainly err for not sua sponte dismissing 
the case for lack of evidence that Defendant knew about the 
gun. 
Even if Defendant had not invited error, he could not prevail on his plain 
error claim. In reviewing a claim that the evidence was insufficient to support a 
conviction, this Court will "view[] the evidence and all inferences drawn therefrom 
in a light most favorable to the jury's verdict" and then determine whether the 
evidence "is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable such that reasonable 
minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the 
crime for which he or she was convicted/' State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, ^ f 18,10 P.3d 
346 (citing State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1212 (Utah 1993) (internal quotations 
omitted)). Where the alleged insufficiency is raised in the context of a plain error 
claim, this Court will then "determine whether the evidentiary defect was so 
obvious and fundamental that it was plain error to submit the case to the jury." Id. 
Defendant has not met the plain error burden: (1) Defendant has not marshaled the 
evidence supporting a finding that he did, in fact, know that Miguel, the principal, 
had a gun; (2) no settled controlling appellate law requires that Defendant, as a 
party, knew that Miguel had a gun; (3) the evidence sufficed to support a finding 
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that Defendant did know about the gun; and (4) Defendant has not demonstrated 
harm. 
1. Defendant has not marshaled the evidence supporting a 
finding that he did, in fact, know that Miguel had a gun. 
Relevant law. To prevail on a sufficiency challenge, the appellant must 
marshal all the evidence in support of the verdict and then demonstrate that, even 
viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence is insufficient. Clten v. 
Stewart, 2004 UT 82, f 76,100 P.3d 1177. The marshaling burden is a difficult one. 
To properly discharge it, the appellant must present, "'in comprehensive and 
fastidious order, every scrap of competent evidence introduced at trial which 
supports the very findings the appellant resists/" Chen, 2004 UT 82, % 77 (quoting 
Neely v. Bennett, 2002 UT App 189, f 11, 51 P.3d 724)). The appellant must then 
"ferret out a fatal flaw in the evidence/7 West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 
1311,1315 (Utah App. 1991). 
Thus, it is not enough to "simply provide an exhaustive review of all evidence 
presented at trial." Chen, 2004 UT 82, ^ 77 (citation omitted). "Rather, appellants 
must provide a precisely focused summary of all the evidence supporting the 
[challenged verdict]/7 Chen, 2004 UT 82, f 77 (citation omitted). Failure to meet the 
marshaling burden is grounds alone for rejecting an attadk on the sufficiency of the 
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evidence. State v. Hopkins, 1999 UT 98, f 16, 989 P.2d 1065; Crookston v. Fire Ins. 
Exch., 817 P.2d 789, 800 (Utah 1991). 
Analysis. Defendant has not met his marshaling burden. Defendant claims 
that the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction for aggravated robbery 
and, in particular, asserts that the evidence does not suffice to show that he knew 
that Miguel possessed or intended to use a gun. See Br. Appellant at 26-36, 40. 
Defendant claims that "the State failed to present any evidence indicating that [he] 
intended, or even knew, that a dangerous weapon was going to be used during the 
commission of the underlying robbery/' Br. Appellant at 27. The State contends 
that Utah law does not require such knowledge. But, even assuming that it did, 
Defendant has ignored evidence in the record from which the jury could have 
inferred that he knew Miguel had a gun. 
Defendant has not marshaled the following evidence that would support a 
finding that he knew about the gun. He has not marshaled Cassandra's testimony 
regarding his understanding that a robbery would occur. See R148:55-103. 
Specifically, he has not marshaled her testimony regarding his cruising back and 
forth in front of the salon. See R148:66-68. He has not marshaled Laura's testimony 
regarding the way that the driver of the green car slowed in front of the salon and 
then stepped on the gas as he repeatedly drove past. See R148:36-37. This testimony 
was relevant to whether Defendant had actively participated in planning the 
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robbery and may therefore have known that a gun would be used. See, e.g., United 
States v. Sanborn, 563 F.2d 488,490 (1st Cir. 1977) (jury could infer from accomplice's 
close association with principal in planning and carrying out robbery that 
accomplice knew about gun). 
Significantly, Defendant completely ignores Cassandra's testimony that, after 
driving Miguel to the beauty salon, and while cruising back and forth near the salon 
as he waited for Miguel, Defendant repeatedly told her that she had "better get 
down." See R148:66-68. These statements were relevant to Defendant's knowledge 
because they suggested, and a jury could have inferred, that Defendant knew a gun 
might be used and therefore urged Cassandra to take cover before any gun was 
fired. 
Moreover, Defendant has not marshaled the facts demonstrating that, even 
after he and Casandra heard a gun shot, even after Casandra urged him not to wait 
for Miguel, and, in fact, even during the time Miguel was fleeing, Defendant waited 
for and intentionally aided Miguel in leaving the crime scfene and then in hiding the 
gun. See R148:68-69. The evidence supported a finding that Defendant did know 
that a gun was used during the commission of the robbery and that, despite that 
knowledge, he continued to intentionally aid Miguel. Thus, Defendant intentionally 
aided Miguel in committing a robbery, as a perpetrator's| flight is considered to be 
"in the course of committing a robbery." See Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-302(3) ("an act 
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shall be considered to be 'in the course of committing a robbery' if it occurs in an 
attempt to commit, during the commission of, or in the immediate flight after the 
attempt or commission of a robbery"). 
Defendant's failure to marshal is reason alone to reject his challenge to the 
sufficiency of the evidence. 
2. Even if Defendant were excused from marshaling, he could 
not prevail on his plain error claim, because he has not 
shown obvious error. 
But even if this Court addressed Defendant's plain error claim on the merits, 
he could not prevail, because he could not show that any error was obvious. To 
establish plain error a defendant must show that "(i) an error exists; (ii) the error 
should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful, i.e., absent 
the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome." State v. Lee, 
2006 UT 5, \ 26,128 P.2d 1179 (citation and internal quotation omitted). An error is 
obvious only if "the law governing the error was clear at the time the alleged error 
was made." State v. Dean, 2004 UT 63, \ 16, 95 P.3d 276. "Utah courts have 
repeatedly held that a trial court's error is not plain where there is no settled 
appellate law to guide the trial court." State v. Ross, 951 P.2d 236, 239 (Utah App. 
1997) (citing State v. Eldredge, 773 P.2d 29,35-36 (Utah 1989); State v. Braun, 778 P.2d 
1336,1341-42 (Utah App. 1990)). 
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Here, there is no settled controlling appellate law requiring that an 
accomplice know that a principal possesses a gun before the accomplice can be 
found guilty as a party to aggravated robbery. The clbsest Utah case is State v. 
Smith, 706 P.2d 1052 (Utah 1985). While not directly addressing the issue here, the 
Utah Supreme Court's analysis in Smith suggests that the evidence to support a 
party's conviction of aggravated robbery based on the u$e of a dangerous weapon 
need not include the party's knowledge that a principal has a gun. The court stated, 
"[I]n order to convict [Smith] of aggravated robbery in this case, the jury had to find 
that [Smith] solicited, requested, commanded, encouraged, or intentionally aided 
another person or persons to engage in the robbery; [Smith] did so intentionally and 
knowingly; and a deadly weapon, firearm, or facsimile of a firearm was used in the 
commission of the crime." Id. at 1056. Thus, the court set forth the mental state 
required to establish that an accused, as a party or accomplice, committed 
aggravated robbery: the prosecution must show that the party acted intentionally 
and knowingly. See id. The court also set forth the act(s) that must be shown to 
establish that the party committed the offense: the party must have solicited, 
requested, commanded, encouraged, or intentionally aided the principal to engage 
in a robbery. See id. Finally, the court set forth the requirement that a dangerous 
weapon be used in the commission of the robbery. See id. The court did not, 
however, set forth any requirement that the accomplice must have known that the 
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principal had or planned to carry a weapon. Smith therefore suggests that such 
knowledge is not required. 
Defendant cites no Utah precedent requiring that an accomplice know that the 
principal has a weapon. He relies instead on three cases from the Fifth Circuit and 
2
 The Smith holding is consistent with statutory law governing aggravated 
robbery, Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302, and party liability, Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-202. 
The aggravated robbery statute provides that a person commits aggravated robbery 
"if in the course of committing robbery, he . . . uses or threatens to use a dangerous 
weapon." Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (l)(a). The aggravated robbery statute sets 
forth no mental state other than that necessary to establish robbery. See id. It does 
not require that the prosecution establish mental culpability with respect to any of 
the aggravating factors. See id. The party liability statute provides simply that 
"[ejvery person, acting with the mental state required for the commission of an 
offense who . . . encourages [] or intentionally aids another person to engage" in the 
offense shall be criminally liable as a party. Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-202. 
3
 Defendant has cited to a number of Utah cases in support of his argument. 
All are distinguishable. For his proposition that the State must have presented some 
evidence indicating that he intended to aid Miguel with a robbery involving a 
dangerous weapon, Defendant cites In re M.B., 2008 UT App 433,198 P.3d 1007; In re 
V.T., 2000 UT App 189, 5 P.3d 1234; and State v. Labrum, 959 P.2d 120 (Utah App. 
1998). These three cases hold only that "mere presence" at a crime scene is not 
sufficient to support a finding of party liability. Rather, an accomplice must 
encourage or intentionally aid the principal. See M.B., 2008 UT App 433, ^  6-17; 
V.T., 2000 UT App 189, f 10; Labrum, 959 P.2d at 123-24. But in Defendant's claim 
on appeal the issue is not whether Defendant was merely present, but rather 
whether Defendant had to know that Miguel possessed a gun. These three cases do 
not address that matter. 
Defendant also cites State v. Webb, 790 P.2d 65 (Utah App. 1990). Webb does 
not suggest that an aggravated robbery conviction requires a party's knowledge that 
(Footnote continues on following page.) 
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one case from the United States Supreme Court. The Fifth Circuit decisions are not 
precedent for Utah courts. Moreover, the decisions, United States v. Lopez-Urbina, 
434 F.3d 750,757-58 (5th Or. 2005); United States v. Sorrells, 145 F.3d 744,753 & 757-
58 (5th Cir. 1998); and United States v. Thompson, 454 F.3d 459,466 (5th Or. 2006), are 
distinguishable because they arise, not in cases of aggravated robbery, but in cases 
involving convictions for aiding and abetting the use and carrying of a firearm 
during a crime of violence, see Lopez-Urbina, 434 F.3d at ^57-59; Sorrells, 145 F.3d at 
753-55; and for brandishing a firearm during a bank robbery, Thompson, 454 F.3d at 
(5th Cir. 2006), all in violation of federal law. Defendant's fourth case, Bailey v. 
United States, 516 U.S. 137 (1995), is also distinguishable. Bailey held that under 
now-amended federal law, a conviction for use of a firearm under 18 U.S.C.A. 
§ 924(c)(1) requires some active employment of a firearm, rather than mere 
possession of the firearm. See id. at 150. These cases have little, if any, relevance to 
Defendant's argument that Utah statutory law requires that an accomplice to 
aggravated robbery know that the principal possesses a gun. 
a principal possesses a weapon, nor does it address that question. Rather, the case 
simply holds that there was credible evidence that Webb, who solicited the theft of a 
getaway car used in the robbery and located a purchaser for the goods prior to the 
robbery, was not"merely present/' See id. at 84-85. 
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Moreover, a number of other courts have held that the prosecution does not 
have to prove that an accomplice knew that the principal had a gun to establish 
aggravated robbery. While their statutes may not necessarily be identical to Utah's, 
their analysis is informative. New York courts, for instance, have held that the 
state's statutes simply do not require that the prosecution establish "[mjental 
culpability with respect to any of the aggravating factors that elevate a [simple] 
robbery" to an aggravated robbery. See, e.g., People v. Parker, 468 N.Y.S.2d 731, 731 
(N.Y. App. Div. 1983). For this reason, 'The People do not have to prove as an 
element of robbery in the first degree... that a defendant knew that his accomplices 
intended to use, or threaten the immediate use of, a dangerous instrument/' Id. 
Other courts do not require direct or explicit evidence that a party knew 
before the crime that a dangerous weapon would be used. Rather, they hold that 
the fact finder can infer from the accomplice's participation in the robbery that the 
use of a weapon was foreseeable. The First Circuit, for instance, has held that 
evidence was sufficient to support a conviction for armed robbery where the 
accomplice helped the principal plan a robbery, drove the principal to the robbery 
site, and waited for and escaped with him, even in the absence of direct testimony 
that the accomplice knew a weapon would be used. See United States v. Sanborn, 563 
F.2d 488, 490 (1st Cir. 1977). In so holding, the First Circuit reasoned that under 
these circumstances, a jury could "conclude that an accomplice so closely associated 
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with the venture could not fail to know what would be the central question in any 
robbery: how the robbers were to force the bank's employees to part with the 
money/' Id. 
North Carolina courts have held that a jury can $nd a defendant guilty of 
aggravated robbery, even without explicit knowledge th^t a co-defendant carried a 
weapon, where it was reasonably foreseeable that a robbery could become an armed 
robbery. See, e.g., State v. Walker, 572 S.E.2d 866, 870 (N.£. App. 2002). The court 
upheld Walker's conviction against a claim that "there [wa]s no evidence that 
defendant knew that any of the co-defendants were armed," reasoning that a party 
to robbery may also be found guilty as a party to "any other crime committed by the 
[principal] in pursuance of the common purpose . . . or as a natural or probable 
consequence thereof." Id. 
The Second Circuit has held that an accomplice who, after learning that a 
dangerous weapon has been used, continues to assist th0 principal (usually in the 
principal's flight from the robbery) is liable as a party to the armed robbery. See, 
e.g., United States v. James, 998 F.2d 74, 80-82 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding that escape 
driver with no prior knowledge that the principal would be armed is nevertheless 
aider and abettor of armed robbery if he knowingly and w|illfully joins in the escape 
phase of an armed bank robbery after learning that an accomplice has used a gun). 
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In sum, given no controlling appellate law or even definitive law, the trial 
court did not obviously err for not requiring that the State establish that Defendant 
knew about the gun. Defendant's plain error claim therefore fails on this basis. 
3. In any event, the evidence sufficed to support a finding 
that Defendant did know that the principal was carrying a 
gun. 
Even assuming the law required that a party know that the principal had a 
gun, Defendant could not prevail on his plain error claim. The evidence sufficed to 
support a finding that Defendant did, in fact, know that Miguel, the principal, had a 
gun and that he aided Miguel in the robbery even after he knew that Miguel had 
used the gun. First, the evidence showed that Defendant had planned the robbery 
with Miguel and knew what was about to occur. See R148:64-68. The evidence 
showed that Defendant, driving Miguel to the site, helped "case out" the salon, 
repeatedly driving past it, slowing down as he did so, and then speeding up 
afterward. See id. More directly, the evidence showed that after dropping off 
Miguel near the salon, Defendant drove past the salon waiting for Miguel to come 
out, repeatedly telling Cassandra that she had "better get down." R148:66-68. This 
evidence supported an inference that Defendant knew that gun fire might occur 
and, in turn, knew that Miguel was carrying a gun. 
Even more clearly, the evidence showed that while Defendant and Cassandra 
waited in the getaway car for Miguel, a gunshot rang out. See R148:68. Cassandra 
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testified that she heard it, and the jury could readily have inferred that Defendant 
heard it too. See id. Over Cassandra's protestations, however, Defendant refused to 
leave and remained on the scene to aid Miguel in his flight from the robbery site 
after Defendant knew that a gun had been used. See id. Thus, even if Defendant did 
not know of the gun until that point, he intentionally aided Miguel in his flight after 
he heard the shot and knew that Miguel had a gun. "An act [is] considered to be 'in 
the course of committing a robbery' if it occurs in an attempt to commit, during the 
commission of, or in the immediate flight after the attempt or commission or a 
robbery." Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302(3). Thus, the evidence sufficed to show that 
Defendant intentionally aided Miguel "in the course of committing a robbery," 
knowing that Miguel had a gun. 
Because the evidence was sufficient to support a jury finding that Defendant 
knew that Miguel, the principal, had a gun and still intentionally aided him, 
Defendant cannot prevail on his claim that the trial court plainly erred by 
submitting the aggravated robbery charge to the jury. Assuming arguendo that 
such knowledge was necessary, the evidence sufficed to support a jury finding that 
Defendant knew that Miguel had the gun. Defendant therefore cannot show that 
the trial court erred, let alone plainly erred, in not sua sponte dismissing the charge. 
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4. Defendant has not demonstrated harm. 
Finally, to establish plain error a defendant must show that "the error is 
harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable 
outcome/7 Lee, 2006 UT 5, f 26 (citation and internal quotation omitted). Defendant 
has not shown plain error because he has not shown that error, if any, resulted in 
harm. A defendant may be convicted of aggravated robbery if, in the course of 
committing robbery, he "uses or threatens to use a dangerous weapon" or "causes 
serious bodily upon another." Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302. Here, the jury was 
instructed that they could find Defendant guilty of aggravated robbery based on 
either of these two alternatives. See R117. 
Defendant suffered no harm when the trial court did not sua sponte 
determine that the evidence was insufficient to show that he knew about the gun. 
Had the trial court concluded that the evidence was insufficient to support a finding 
of aggravated robbery based on the use of a gun, it would nevertheless have 
submitted the aggravated robbery charge to the jury on the alternative basis that the 
robbery resulted in a serious bodily injury. The evidence as to the serious bodily 
injury was not only sufficient, but also uncontested and overwhelming. See R148:27, 
136-37, Given the overwhelming evidence of the serious bodily injury, Defendant 
cannot show that "absent [any] error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more 
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favorable outcome/7 i.e., a reasonable likelihood that the jury would not have 
convicted him of aggravated robbery. Lee, 2006 UT 5, % 26. 
II. 
(Partial Response to Defendant's Point II) 
TRIAL COUNSEL DID NOT PERFORM INEFFECTIVELY FOR 
NOT ATTACKING THE SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE TO 
ESTABLISH AGGRAVATED ROBBERY AND FOR NOT 
MOVING TO DISMISS THE AGGRAVATED ROBBERY 
CHARGE 
Defendant attempts to circumvent the application of the invited error doctrine 
and the deficiencies in his plain error argument by alternatively claiming that 
counsel was ineffective for not moving to dismiss the aggravated robbery charge.4 
Defendant cannot prevail on this claim, however, because he cannot show either 
deficient performance or prejudice. 
Relevant law. "An ineffective assistance of counsel claim raised for the first 
time on appeal presents a question of law." State v. Clar\, 2004 UT 25, f 6, 89 P.3d 
162. To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, Defendant must demonstrate 
4
 While Defendant claims trial counsel erred both in failing to move to dismiss 
and in failing to move for a directed verdict, he does not distinguish between the 
two motions. See Br. Appellant at 35. The State therefore addresses his claim as a 
claim that counsel was deficient for failing to move to dismiss. 
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both that "counsel's performance was deficient, in that it fell below an objective 
standard of reasonable professional judgment," and that "counsel's deficient 
performance was prejudicial—i.e., that it affected the outcome of the case." State v. 
Litherland, 2000 UT 76,119,12 P.3d 92 (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 
687-88 (1984)). 
In proving the first prong of Strickland—that counsel's representation fell 
below an objective standard of reasonableness — Defendant must demonstrate "why, 
on the basis of the law in effect at the time of trial, his or her trial counsel's 
performance was deficient." State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201,1228 (Utah 1993) (citations 
omitted). Defendant may not predicate a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel 
on a novel question of law. See Lilly v. Gilmore, 988 F.2d 783, 786 (7th Cir. 1993) 
("The Sixth Amendment does not require counsel to forecast changes or advances in 
the law. . . . " ) ; cf. United States v. Cook, 45 F.3d 388, 395 (10th Cir. 1995) (Sixth 
Amendment does not require appellate counsel to raise every nonfrivolous issue). 
"'[An] ineffective assistance claim succeeds only when no conceivable legitimate 
tactic or strategy can be surmised from counsel's actions.'" State v. Main, 2005 UT 
App 494,\20,125 P.3d 103 (quoting State v. Tennyson, 850 P.2d 461,468 (Utah App. 
1994)). Counsel's failure "to make motions or objections [that] would be futile if 
raised does not constitute ineffective assistance." State v. Whittle, 1999 UT 96, |^ 34, 
989 P.2d 52 (quotations and citations omitted). 
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A, A reasonable strategy existed for counsel's challenging the 
sufficiency of the evidence to show Defendant's knowledge of 
the robbery rather than his knowledge of the gun. 
Counsel did, in fact, move to dismiss the aggravated robbery charge. See 
R149:7. Counsel moved to dismiss on grounds that Defendant did not know that 
Miguel intended to commit a robbery. See R149:7-8. This was the only motion that 
made sense under the procedural posture of this case. As explained, the 
prosecution could have established aggravated robbery in this case based on either 
or two aggravating circumstances — first, the use of a gun, and second, a serious 
bodily injury. Had counsel attacked the sufficiency of the evidence of aggravated 
robbery for lack of Defendant's knowledge about the gun, the aggravated robbery 
charge would still have gone to the jury on the alternative uncontested basis — 
serious bodily injury. And, given that in convicting Defendant of aggravated 
robbery the jury necessarily found all of the elements of robbery, see R117 (jury 
instruction 36, setting forth the elements of aggravated robbery, including those 
required to convict on simple robbery), and given the overwhelming evidence of 
serious bodily injury, see R148:27,136-37, the jury would still have convicted him on 
the aggravated robbery count. 
Moreover, getting rid of the gun alternative would have done nothing to help 
Defendant with his murder count. As Defendant concedes, Br. Appellant at 35-36, 
either robbery or aggravated robbery could have served as the predicate for the 
33 
felony murder conviction. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203. Thus, counsel had a 
conceivable strategic reason for trying to get the robbery itself, and not just the 
aggravated robbery, thrown out. If Defendant did not know about the robbery, he 
could not have knowingly and intentionally participated in it and could not have 
been an accomplice. If he could not have been an accomplice, he could not have 
been guilty of even simple robbery and therefore could not have been guilty of 
felony murder. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203. Where a conceivable strategic 
reason existed for counsel's not attacking the aggravating factor and for instead 
attacking the robbery itself, counsel's performance was not deficient. See Mahi, 2005 
UT App 494, \ 20. 
Moreover, once the trial court had denied Defendant's motion to dismiss, 
ruling that the evidence sufficed to support a conviction, any subsequent motion to 
dismiss would have been futile. As explained, counsel does not perform deficiently 
for not making futile motions. See Whittle, 1999 UT 96, «f 34. 
B. Counsel was not deficient for not moving to dismiss where no 
controlling appellate precedent required a showing that 
Defendant knew that the principal had a gun. 
As explained, in proving that counsel's representation fell below an objective 
standard of reasonableness, Defendant must demonstrate "why, on the basis of the 
law in effect at the time of trial, his or her trial counsel's performance was deficient." 
Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1228. He may not predicate a claim of ineffective assistance on a 
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novel question of law. See Lilly v. Gilmore, 988 F.2d at 7^ 86; see also United States v. 
Cook, 45 F.3d at 395. 
Here, as explained under Point IC2., above, there is no controlling appellate 
law requiring that an accomplice have knowledge that a principal possesses a gun 
before he can be convicted as a party to aggravated robbery. As explained, the 
closest Utah case, Smith, 706 P.22d at 1056, suggests that such knowledge is not 
required. 
Where no Utah law requires that a defendant know that the principal had a 
dangerous weapon and where the closest precedent suggests that such knowledge is 
not necessary, Defendant cannot demonstrate, "on the basis of the law in effect at 
the time of trial," that counsel was deficient for not arguing that the evidence was 
insufficient. Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1228. He thus cannot demonstrate that counsel was 
deficient for not moving to dismiss the aggravated robbery charge for lack of 
evidence of Defendant's knowledge of the gun.5 
5
 Defendant also claims that counsel was deficient for not "request[ing] a 
lesser included offense instruction regarding robbery." Br. Appellant at 35. The 
Court should decline review of this one-sentence conclusory claim, which lacks both 
citation to authority and "reasoned analysis based on that authority/' West 
Jordan City v. Goodman, 2006 UT 27, | 29,135 P.3d 874, quoting State v. Jaeger, 
1999 UT 1, If 31, 973 P.2d 404. 
(Footnote continues on following page.) 
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C In addition, counsel was not deficient for not moving to 
dismiss because the evidence sufficed to show that Defendant 
did, in fact, know that a gun was being used. 
In any event, counsel was also not deficient for not moving to dismiss the 
aggravated robbery charge, because, contrary to Defendant's claim, the evidence did 
suffice to show that Defendant knew about the gun.6 Defendant's girlfriend, 
Cassandra, testified that Defendant cruised back and forth in front of the salon 
before dropping Defendant off nearby. See R148:66-68. Laura testified that the 
driver of the green car slowed in front of the salon and then stepped on the gas as he 
repeatedly passed the salon. See R148:36-37. This testimony supported a finding 
that Defendant knew about and had actively participated in the robbery and may 
therefore have known a gun would be used. Cassandra also testified that after 
dropping off Miguel, Defendant cruised back and forth in front of the salon, 
Moreover, the "failure to request a lesser-included offense instruction" is a 
"classic example of an all-or-nothing approach, whereby counsel attempts to secure 
an acquittal by precluding the jury from reaching a compromise verdict of guilt on 
the lesser offense/' See State v. Kaaloa, 2006 UT App 501U (citing State v. Hall, 946 
P.2d 712, 723-24 (Utah App. 1997). "Such a strategy does not constitute ineffective 
assistance of counsel/' Id. (citing Hall, 946 P.2d at 723-24). 
6
 Again, Defendant has not marshaled the evidence relevant to his underlying 
insufficiency claim, and this Court should reject his claim on that basis alone. See 
Hopkins, 1999 UT 98, f 16. 
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repeatedly telling her that she had "better get down." See R148:66~68. This evidence 
suggested that Defendant knew a gun might be used and therefore was urging 
Cassandra to take cover. This evidence was sufficient, in &e context of this case, to 
support a reasonable inference that Defendant knew before he ever dropped Miguel 
off that Miguel had a gun and that he might possibly use it. 
Moreover, Cassandra testified to hearing the shots while she was in the car 
with Defendant. R148:68. A jury could reasonably infer that Defendant heard them 
too and therefore knew that Miguel had used a gun. But despite that knowledge 
and despite Cassandra's urging him to leave, Defendant remained at the scene after 
the gun was fired to pick up Miguel during his getaway. R148:68-69. Under Utah 
law, an act is "'in the course of committing a robbery' if it occurs in an attempt to 
commit, during the commission of, or in the immediate flight after the attempt or 
commission of the robbery." Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302(3). 
Thus, this evidence supported a finding that Defendant intentionally aided 
Miguel in his flight after Defendant knew not only that a gun was present, but also 
after he knew that it had been used. Thus, even if a party must know that the 
principal possesses a weapon, the evidence was sufficient to show that Defendant 
had that knowledge and still intentionally aided Miguel in the commission of the 
robbery. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-202 (person is liable as party if he "intentionally 
aids another person to engage in conduct which constitutes an offense"). Because 
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the evidence sufficed, defense counsel was not deficient for not moving to dismiss 
the aggravated robbery charge. 
D. Defendant has not demonstrated prejudice, where the 
evidence sufficed to support a finding that the victim suffered 
serious bodily injury, an alternative ground for convicting on 
the aggravated charge. 
Under the second prong of an ineffectiveness claim, Defendant must 
demonstrate "a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, 
the result of the proceeding would have been different." Strickland v. Washington, 
466 U.S. 668,695 (1984). In making this determination, the court must consider "the 
totality of the evidence" presented. Id. at 665. "Taking the unaffected findings as a 
given, and taking due account of the effect of the errors on the remaining findings," 
the court must determine if it is "reasonably likely" that the outcome would have 
been different. Id. at 696. 
Here, Defendant has not demonstrated prejudice. He has not shown that, had 
defense counsel moved to dismiss the aggravated robbery charge for his alleged 
lack of knowledge about the gun, there was a "reasonable probability" of a different 
outcome. 
As explained under Point IC4., a defendant may be convicted of aggravated 
robbery if, in the course of committing a robbery, he "uses or threatens to use a 
dangerous weapon" or "causes serious bodily injury." Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302. 
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The jury was instructed that they could find Defendant guilty of aggravated robbery 
based on either of these two alternatives. See R117. 
Had defense counsel moved to dismiss the aggravated robbery charge for lack 
of evidence that Defendant knew about the gun, had the trial court ruled that the 
evidence was necessary, and had the trial court ruled that the evidence was lacking, 
the trial court would still have submitted the aggravated robbery charge to the jury 
on the uncontested alternative basis that the robbery resulted in serious bodily 
injury. Moreover, given that the jury found all of the elements of simple robbery, see 
R117, and given that the evidence overwhelmingly established Faviola's serious 
bodily injury, see R148:27,136-37, Defendant cannot show a reasonable probability 
that the verdict on aggravated robbery would have been different. 
III. 
REVIEW FOR MANIFEST INJUSTICE DOES NOT LIE WHERE 
DEFENDANT, THROUGH COUNSEL, AFFIRMATIVELY 
APPROVED THE JURY INSTRUCTIONS SETTING FORTH THE 
DANGEROUS WEAPON ENHANCEMENT ELEMENTS 
Defendant asserts that the trial court improperly instructed the jury on the 
elements of the dangerous weapon enhancement and that the improper instructions 
resulted in manifest injustice. Br. Appellant at 41,43. Defendant cannot prevail on 
this claim because defense counsel invited any error beldw. 
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Relevant law. Utah's appellate courts have repeatedly held that they will not 
address a defendant's challenge to an allegedly inaccurate jury instruction where he 
affirmatively represented to the trial court that he had no objection to it. "While a 
party who fails to object to or give an instruction may have an instruction assigned 
as error under the manifest injustice exception, Utah R. Crim P. 19(e), a party cannot 
take advantage of an error committed at trial when that party led the trial court into 
committing the error/7 State v. Geukgeuzian, 2004 UT 16, | 9, 86 P.3d 742 (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted). "Accordingly, a jury instruction may not be 
assigned as error even if such instruction constitutes manifest injustice 'if counsel, 
either by statement or act, affirmatively represented to the court that he or she had 
no objection to the jury instruction/" Id. (quoting State v. Hamilton, 2003 UT 22, f^ 54, 
70 P.3d 111). Utah courts "have recognized a number of ways in which a defendant 
has led a trial court into committing error." Id. at Tf 10. A defendant invites error 
"where his counsel confirm[s] on the record that the defense has no objection to the 
instructions given by the trial court." Id. He also invites error "when he fail[s] to 
object to an instruction when specifically queried by the court." Id. 
Analysis, Before closing argument, the trial court asked both parties whether 
they had any objections to the jury instructions. See R149:25. The trial court asked 
defense counsel, "Will counsel for the Defendant acknowledge that there are no 
instructions that counsel have requested that I have not given." Id. Defense counsel 
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answered, "Yes, I will acknowledge that/' Id. The court continued, "You have no 
objection to the instructions being given?" Id. Counsel answered, "Yes, Your 
Honor," conveying that she had no objection. Id. 
In answering the court's questions, defense counsel affirmatively represented 
that she approved all the instructions, including those on the dangerous weapon 
enhancement. Counsel thereby invited the error that Defendant now attempts to 
raise under the manifest injustice doctrine. See Br. Appellant at 20 (acknowledging 
that "[t]he instructions given by the court . . . at the close of all the evidence were 
approved by counsel for both parties"). Thus, review for manifest injustice is 
unavailable. This Court will not address a claim of error raised under the manifest 
injustice doctrine, where a party invited that error below. See Finder, 2005 UT 15, 
\ 61; Geukgeuzian, 2004 UT 15, % 9; Hamilton, 2003 UT 22. 
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IV. 
(Partial Response to Defendant's Point I) 
DEFENDANT HAS NOT ESTABLISHED INEFFECTIVE 
ASSISTANCE BASED ON COUNSEL'S NOT OBJECTING TO 
THE DANGEROUS WEAPON ENHANCEMENT 
INSTRUCTION; DEFENDANT HAS NOT DEMONSTRATED 
PREJUDICE, WHERE THE EVIDENCE SHOWED THAT HE 
KNEW A GUN WAS PRESENT 
Defendant claims that trial counsel was ineffective for not "requesting] a 
proper instruction requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt as to the elements of 
the dangerous weapon enhancement/' Br. Appellant at 22. Defendant claims that 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.8 "explicitly require[s] proof beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the defendant was aware that a dangerous weapon was being used in the 
commission of a crime." Id. at 28. 
As explained, to establish ineffective assistance of counsel, Defendant must 
demonstrate both that "counsel's performance was deficient, in that it fell below an 
objective standard of reasonable professional judgment," and that "counsel's 
deficient performance was prejudicial — i.e., that it affected the outcome of the case." 
Litherland, 2000 UT 76, ^ 19 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88). 
Enhancements for use of a dangerous weapon. The statute governing sentence 
increases where a dangerous weapon is used —Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.8 — 
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specifies the circumstances under which a party to an offense may be subject to an 
enhanced sentence based on a co-perpetrator's use of a dangerous weapon: 
(1) As used in this section, "dangerous weapon" has the same 
definition as in Section 76-1-601. 
(2) If the trier of fact finds beyond a reasonable doubt that a 
dangerous weapon was used in the commission or 
furtherance of a felony, the court: 
(a) (i) shall increase by one year the minimum term of the 
sentence applicable by law; and 
(ii) if the minimum term applicable by law is zeuo, shall set the 
minimum term as one year; and 
(b) may increase by five years the maximum sentence applicable 
by law in the case of a felony of the second or third degree. 
(3) A defendant who is a party to a felony offense shall be 
sentenced to the increases in punishment provided in 
Subsection (2) if the trier of fact finds beyond a reasonable 
doubt that: 
(a) a dangerous weapon was used in the commission or 
furtherance of the felony; and 
(b) the defendant knew that the dangerous weapon was present. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.8. Under the statute, a party to a felony therefore is 
subject to an enhancement only if a dangerous weapon was used and the party 
"knew that the dangerous weapon was present." Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.8(3)(b). 
Jwy instmictions. The trial court gave two instructions regarding the 
enhancement in this case: 
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Instruction number 41. 
You are instructed that under Utah law, if in the commission 
or furtherance of an Aggravated Robbery a defendant uses a 
dangerous weapon, he is subject to . . . an enhanced penalty. 
Instruction number 42. 
You are instructed that if you find that the crime of 
Aggravated Robbery occurred, you must further find whether 
or not the defendant is subject to an enhanced penalty. In 
order to find that the defendant is subject to an enhanced 
penalty under Utah Law, you must find from all of the 
evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt, that: 
1. A dangerous weapon was used in the commission or 
furtherance of the Aggravated Robbery. 
If after careful consideration of all of the evidence in this case, 
you are convinced of the truth of this element beyond a 
reasonable doubt, then you must find the defendant subject to 
an enhanced penalty pursuant to Utah Law. If, on the other 
hand, you are not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of the 
foregoing element, then you must find that the defendant is 
not subject to an enhanced penalty. 
R122-23. 
Analysis. The jury instructions properly set forth the law regarding 
enhancements except for one provision. Under the relevant statutes, an accused can 
be found subject to an increased sentence as a party only if a jury finds beyond a 
reasonable doubt that (1) "a dangerous weapon is used in the commission or 
furtherance of the felony'' and (2) "the defendant knew that the dangerous weapon 
was present/' Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.8(3). The jury instructions, apparently 
inadvertently, did not set forth the requirement that the defendant, as a party, 
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"knew that the dangerous weapon was present." The instructions setting forth the 
elements therefore could theoretically have allowed the jury to find Defendant 
subject to an enhancement on lesser proof than that required by the statute and 
counsel may have been deficient for not requesting a change in the instruction. 
Nevertheless, Defendant cannot prevail on his claim that counsel was 
ineffective because he has not shown that any "deficient performance was 
prejudicial —i.e., that it affected the outcome of the case." Litherland, 2000 UT 76, 
\ 19 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88). 
Based on the evidence, there was no reasonable probability that, absent any 
error, the jury would have found Defendant not subject to the enhancement. The 
evidence showed that Defendant had planned the robbery with Miguel and knew 
what was about to happen. See R148:64-68. More importantly, the evidence showed 
that Defendant knew that a gun was present. As he drove past the salon waiting for 
Miguel to exit, Defendant repeatedly told Cassandra that she had "better get down," 
supporting an inference that he knew that gun fire might occur and, in turn, that he 
knew that Miguel was carrying a gun. R148:66-68. 
Most clearly, the evidence showed that while Defendant waited for Miguel, a 
gunshot rang out. R148:68. Cassandra testified that she heard it, and the jury could 
readily have inferred that Defendant heard it too. Id. Cassandra then urged 
Defendant to leave, but that Defendant refused, remaining on the scene to 
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intentionally aid Miguel in his flight from the robbery after he knew that a gun had 
been used. R148:69. 
As explained, the flight following the commission or attempted commission 
of a robbery is, under statute, "in the course of committing a robbery/' See Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-6-302. Thus, the evidence established that Defendant knew that 
Miguel had carried and used a gun when he intentionally aided Miguel during his 
flight and thus during the course of Miguel's committing a robbery. Because the 
evidence established that Defendant knew that the gun was present, Defendant 
cannot show that any error setting forth the enhancement elements affected the 
outcome of the case.7 
Because Defendant has not demonstrated prejudice, he has not established 
that trial counsel was ineffective. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm. If this Court holds that 
the trial court plainly erred or that counsel performed ineffectively with respect to 
7
 Defendant has challenged his sentencing enhancement under the plain error 
and ineffective assistance of counsel doctrines. While Defendant has also raised the 
alleged error in the enhancement instructions under rule 22(e), Utah R. Crim. P., the 
Court need not address the rule 22(e) claim, because its ruling on the ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim will resolve the issue. 
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Defendant's conviction for aggravated robbery, the Court may enter a conviction for 
simple robbery.8 If this Court holds that the trial counsel performed ineffectively for 
8
 If this Court should determine that the trial court plainly erred for not sua 
sponte dismissing the aggravated robbery charge for lack of evidence that 
Defendant knew that Miguel carried a gun, or if this Court should determine that 
trial counsel was ineffective for not moving to dismiss the charge on that basis, it 
should enter a conviction on the lesser included offense of robbery. This Court has 
"the power to modify a criminal judgment on appeal by entering judgment for 
conviction of a lesser included offense/' State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201,1210 n.4 (Utah 
1993). "[W]hen a defendant is convicted of an offense but an error occurred at trial, 
a court has the power to enter judgment for a lesser included offense rather than 
ordering a retrial if (i) the trier of fact necessarily found facts sufficient to constitute 
the lesser offense, and (ii) the error did not affect those findings." Id. at 1209 
(citations omitted); see also State v. McCloud, 2005 UT App 466,115,126 P.3d 775; 
State v. Lyman, 966 R2d 278, 284 (Utah App. 1998). 
Here, the trial court instructed the jury that to convict Defendant of 
aggravated robbery, it had to find the elements of robbery, plus find that a 
dangerous weapon was used or serious bodily injury occurred. R117. Instructions 
33, 36, and 37 set forth all of the elements of robbery, whether by a principal or by 
an accomplice. See R114-17. In finding Defendant guilty as a party to aggravated 
robbery, the jury necessarily found him guilty as a party to the lesser included 
offense of robbery. Compare Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-301 (defining robbery) with R117 
(Instruction number 36, setting for elements of aggravated robbery). And even if the 
instructions on aggravated robbery should have required that the jury find that 
Defendant knew that Miguel had a gun, that error did not affect the findings on the 
lesser included offense of robbery. Thus, this Court can properly enter a conviction 
for robbery. 
Defendant suggests in one or two sentences that reversal of his conviction for 
aggravated robbery would require reversal of his conviction for felony murder 
because, absent the conviction for aggravated robbery, there would be no predicate 
offense to support the felony murder conviction. See Br. Appellant at 38-39. 
(Footnote continues on following page.) 
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not objecting to the enhancement instructions, it may remand for resentencing to 
vacate the enhanced six-years-to-life sentence on the aggravated robbery conviction 
and to impose an unenhanced five-years-to-life sentence for that offense. 
Because this claim is inadequately briefed, this Court should not address it. See 
Green, 2004 UT 76, ^fll. 
In any event, as explained, this Court may properly enter a conviction for the 
lesser included offense of robbery, which, as Defendant concedes, is also a predicate 
offense for felony murder. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (felony murder statute); 
Br. Appellant at 35-36 (concession). 
Moreover, the jury's verdict on felony murder represented its finding that 
Defendant committed all the elements of felony murder, including robbery. See 
Instructions 35 (setting forth elements of felony murder) and 37 (setting forth 
elements of robbery). The felony murder statute does not require a conviction for 
one of the specified predicate offenses. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203. It requires 
only that the jury find beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant committed the 
predicate offense. See id. Here, the jury's finding of the elements of felony murder 
included a finding that Defendant, as a party, commited robbery. See R116 (defining 
felony murder), R118 (defining robbery). Thus, even without this Court's entry of a 
conviction of simple robbery, the reversal of Defendant's aggravated robbery 
conviction would not require reversal of the felony murder conviction. 
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§ 76-5-203. Murder 
(1) As used m this section, "predicate offense" means 
(a) a violation of Section 58-37d-4 oi 58-37d-5 Clandestine Drug Lab Act 
(b) child abuse, undei Subsection 76-5-10^(2)(a), when the victim is younger than 18 
years of age, 
(c) kidnapping undei Section 76-5- >01, 
(d) child kidnapping under Section 76-5-3011, 
(e) aggiavated kidnapping under Section 76-5-302, 
(f) rape of a child under Section 76-5-402 1, 
(g) object rape of a child undei Section 76-5-402 3, 
(h) sodomy upon a child under Section 76-5-403 1, 
(I) forcible sexual abuse undei Section 76-5-^404, 
(j) sexual abuse of a child oi aggravated sexual abuse of a child under Section 
76-5-404 1, 
(k) rape under Section 76-5-402, 
(I) object rape under Section 76-5-402 2, 
(m) forcible sodomy under Section 76-5-403,, 
(n) aggiavated sexual assault under Section 76-5-405, 
(o) ai son under Section 76-6-102, 
(p) aggravated arson under Section 76-6-1 O^ j, 
(q) burglary undei Section 76-6-202, 
(r) aggravated burglary under Section 76-6-^03, 
(s) robbery undei Section 76-6-301, 
(t) aggravated robbeiy under Section 76-6-302, 
(u) escape or aggi avated escape under Section 76-8-309, or 
(v) a felony violation of Subsection 76-10-508(2) legardmg discharge of a firearm oi 
dangerous weapon 
(2) Criminal homicide constitutes murdei if 
(a) the actor intentionally oi knowingly causes the death of anothei, 
(b) intending to cause senous bodily injury to another, the actor commits an act clearly 
dangerous to human life that causes the death of another, 
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OFFENSES AGAINST THE PERSON § 76-5-20; 
(c) acting under circumstances evidencing a depraved indifference to human life, th 
actor knowingly engages in conduct which creates a grave risk of death to another an 
thereby causes the death of another; 
(d)(i) the actor is engaged in the commission, attempted commission, or immediate fligh 
from the commission or attempted commission of any predicate offense, or is a party to th 
predicate offense; 
(ii) a person other than a party as defined in Section 76-2-202 is killed in the course c 
the commission, attempted commission, or immediate flight from the commission c 
attempted commission of any predicate offense; and 
(iii) the actor acted with the intent required as an element of the predicate offense; 
(e) the actor recklessly causes the death of a peace officer while in the commission c 
attempted commission of: 
(i) an assault against a peace officer under Section 76-5-102.4; or 
(ii) interference with a peace officer while making a lawful arrest under Sectio 
76-8-305 if the actor uses force against a peace officer; 
(f) commits a homicide which would be aggravated murder, but the offense is reduce 
pursuant to Subsection 76-5-202(4); or 
(g) the actor commits aggravated murder, but special mitigation is established unde 
Section 76-5-205.5. 
(3)(a) Murder is a first degree felony. 
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indeterarinate term of not less than 15 years and which may be for life. 
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defendant caused the death of another or attempted to cause the death of anotl 
(i) under the influence of extreme emotional distress for which there is a reasons 
explanation or excuse; or 
(ii) under a reasonable belief that the circumstances provided a legal justification 
excuse for his conduct although the conduct was not legally justifiable or excusable un 
the existing circumstances. 
(b) Under Subsection (4)(a)(i) emotional distress does not include: 
(i) a condition resulting from mental illness as defined in Section 76-2-305; or 
(ii) distress that is substantially caused by the defendant's own conduct. 
(c) The reasonableness of an explanation or excuse under Subsection (4)(a)(i) or 
reasonable belief of the actor under Subsection (4)(a)(ii) shall be determined from th 
viewpoint of a reasonable person under the then existing circumstances. 
(d) This affirmative defense reduces charges only as follows: 
(i) murder to manslaughter; and 
(ii) attempted murder to attempted manslaughter. 
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(1) As used in this section, "dangerous weapon" has the same definition 
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term as one year; and 
(b) may increase by five years the maximum sentence applicable by law 
in the case of a felony of the second or third degree. 
(3) A defendant who is a party to a felony offense shall be sentenced to 
the increases in punishment provided in Subsection (2) if the trier of fact 
finds beyond a reasonable doubt that: 
(a) a dangerous weapon was used in the commission or furtherance of the 
felony; and 
(b) the defendant knew that the dangerous weapon was present. 
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Title 76 Utah Criminal Code 
Chapter 6 Offenses Against Property 
Section 301 Robbery. 
76-6-301. Robbery. 
(1) A person commits robbery if: 
(a) the person unlawfully and intentionally takes or attempts to take 
personal property in the possession of another from his person, or immediate 
presence, against his will, by means of force or fear, and with a purpose or 
intent to deprive the person permanently or temporarily of the personal 
property; or 
(b) the person intentionally or knowingly uses force or fear of immediate 
force against another in the course of committing a theft or wrongful 
appropriation. 
(2) An act is considered to be "in the course of committing a theft or 
wrongful appropriation" if it occurs: 
(a) in the course of an attempt to commit theft or wrongful appropriation; 
(b) in the commission of theft or wrongful appropriation; or 
(c) in the immediate flight after the attempt or commission. 
(3) Robbery is a felony of the second degree. 
Amended by Chapter 112, 2004 General Session 
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Title 76 Utah Criminal Code 
Chapter 6 Offenses Against Property 
Section 302 Aggravated robbery. 
76-6-302, Aggravated robbery. 
(1) A person commits aggravated robbery if in the course of committing 
robbery, he: 
(a) uses or threatens to use a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 76-
1-601; 
(b) causes serious bodily injury upon another; or 
(c) takes or attempts to take an operable motor vehicle. 
(2) Aggravated robbery is a first degree felony. 
(3) For the purposes of this part, an act shall be considered to be "in the 
course of committing a robbery" if it occurs in an attempt to commit, during 
the commission of, or in the immediate flight after the attempt or 
commission of a robbery. 
Amended by Chapter 62, 2003 General Session 
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JUN 2 5 2008 
In the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, ^mejott^t^^^^ 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JESUS A. JIMENEZ, 
Defendant, 
JU^Y INSTRUCTIONS 
Case No. 071906002 
Hbn. Deno G. Himonas 
INSTRUCTION NO. 1: It's now my duty, as judge, to instruct you as to the law that 
applies to this case. And it's your duty, as jurors, to follow that law. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 2: You may take the following items only into the jury room: the 
jury instructions, the exhibits admitted in evidence, your notes, and the verdict form. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 3: The first thing to do in the jury npom is choose a "Foreperson". 
The Foreperson's duties are to keep order, allow everyone a chance to speak, and represent the jury 
in any communications that you make. The Foreperson has no more power than any other juror in 
deciding what the verdict should be. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 4: It's rarely good for a juror, on entering the jury room, to make an 
emphatic expression of opinion or to announce a determination to st<pd for a certain verdict. When 
that's done, a person's pride may block appropriate consideration of the case. But don't make a 
decision just to agree with everyone else either: your verdict must be your own. Help each other 
arrive at the truth. Use your common memory, common understanding, and common sense. Talk 
about the case with each other as you ponder and deliberate. And respect and consider the opinions 
of your fellow jurors. If you're persuaded that a decision you initially made was wrong, then don't 
hesitate to change your mind. Also, don't resort to chance or some form of decision-making other 
than honest deliberation. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 5: If you think that you need more information or a clarification, 
write a note and give it to the bailiff. I'll review it with the lawyers and answer your question, if 
appropriate; however, these instructions, should contain all the information that you need in order 
to reach a verdict based upon the evidence. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 6: Your duty is to decide this case and this case alone. You shouldn't 
use this case to correct perceived wrongs in other cases or to express individual or collective views 
about anything other than the guilt or innocence of the defendant. Put a little differently, your verdict 
should reflect the facts, as found by you, applied to the law explained in these instructions and 
shouldn't be distorted by any outside factors or objectives. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 7: This being a criminal case, your verdict must be unanimous on 
each element of the offense. If you all come to an agreement, then you've reached a verdict. At that 
time, the Foreperson should date and sign the verdict form that reflects your decision. The 
Foreperson should then notify the bailiff that you're ready to return to court. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 8: After you've given me the verdict form, the clerk may ask each 
of you about it to make sure that you agree with it. I'll then excuse you. Afterward, you may talk 
about the case with anyone. Likewise, you're not required to talk about it. If anyone insists on 
talking to you about the case when you don't want to, please tell the court clerk. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 9: You're instructed that the defendant, Jesus Jimenez, is charged 
in the Information with murder and aggravated robbery. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 10: You're not to consider Instruction No. 9 as a statement of facts; 
rather, you're to regard it as a summary of the allegations in the Information. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 11: The defendant has entered a plea of not guilty. The plea of not 
guilty denies each of the essential allegations of the count contained in the Information and casts 
upon the prosecution the burden of proving each to your satisfaction and beyond a reasonable doubt. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 12: You're instructed that the mere fact that the defendant has been 
arrested, charged with this offense, and held to answer to the charge, isn't any evidence of guilt or 
even a circumstance that you should consider in detennining guilt or innocence. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 13: In arriving at a verdict, you shouldn't discuss or consider the 
subject of penalty or punishment. That's a matter for the Court and other governmental agencies and 
mustn't in any way affect your decision as to the defendant's guilt or innocence. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 14: All presumptions of law, independent of evidence, are in favor 
of innocence, and a defendant is presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 
This presumption is not a mere formality, but is a substantial part of the law intended, as far as is 
possible, to guard against the danger of an innocent person being unjustly punished. 
The presumption of innocence must continue to prevail in your minds until you're satisfied 
beyond a reasonable doubt of the guilt of the defendant. And, in the case of a reasonable doubt as 
to the defendant's guilt, he is entitled to an acquittal 
Also, the burden is always on the prosecution to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. This 
burden never shifts to the defendant for the law never imposes upon a defendant in a criminal case 
the burden or duty of calling any witnesses or producing any evidence. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 15: Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is proof that leaves you firmly 
convinced of the defendant's guilt. There are very few things in this world that we know with 
absolute certainty, and in criminal cases the law doesn't require proof that overcomes every possible 
doubt. If, based on your consideration of the evidence, you're firmly convinced that the defendant 
is guilty of the crime charged, you must find him guilty. If, on the other hand, you think there's a 
real possibility that he is not guilty, you must give him the benefit of the doubt and find him not 
guilty. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 16: During the trial, the lawyers asked me to determine whether 
certain evidence might be admitted. You're not to be concerned wijh the reasons for such requests 
or rulings and are not to draw any inferences from them. Whether evidence is admissible is purely 
a question of law. In admitting evidence to which an objection is made, I don't determine what 
weight should be given such evidence, nor do I pass on the credibility of the witness. You're not to 
consider evidence offered but not admitted, nor any evidence strickep out by me. As to any question 
to which an objection was sustained, you must not conjecture as to what the answer might have been 
or as to the reason for the objection. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 17: As I've previously explained, you're to try the issues of fact that 
are presented by the allegations in the Information. You should perform this duty uninfluenced by 
pity for or passion or prejudice against the defendant. The law forbids you to be governed by 
sentiment, sympathy, passion, prejudice, or public feeling. Both the prosecution and the defendant 
have a right to expect that you'll conscientiously and dispassionately consider and weigh the 
evidence and apply the law of the case, to reach a just verdict regardless of the consequences. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 18: The evidence that you're to consider includes the testimony of 
witnesses, exhibits received into evidence, stipulations of the parties, reasonable inferences to be 
drawn from facts proven in the case, presumptions, if any, as stated in these instructions, and all of 
the facts and circumstances disclosed thereby. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 19: You should reconcile conflict^ in the evidence as far as you 
reasonably can. But where the conflicts cannot be reconciled, you're the final judges and must 
determine from the evidence what the facts are. You should carefully and conscientiously consider 
and compare all of the testimony and all of the facts and circumstances that have a bearing on any 
issue and determine therefrom what the facts are. You're not bound to believe witnesses unless their 
testimony is reasonable and convincing in view of all of the facts and circumstances in evidence. 
You may believe one witness as against many, or many as against a fewer number, in accordance 
with your honest convictions. If you believe a witness has willfUlly testified falsely as to any 
material fact in this case, you may disregard the whole of the testimony of such a witness, or you 
may give it such weight as you think it's entitled to. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 20: You're the exclusive judges of the credibility of the witnesses 
and the weight of the evidence. In judging the weight of the testimony and credibility of the 
witnesses, you've a right to take into consideration their bias, interest in the result of the suit, or any 
probable motive or lack thereof to testify fairly, if any is shown. You may consider the witnesses' 
deportment on the witness stand, the reasonableness of their statements, their apparent frankness or 
candor, their opportunity to know, their ability to understand, and their capacity to remember. You 
should consider these matters together with all of the other facts ahd circumstances that you may 
believe have a bearing on the truthfulness or accuracy of the witnesses' statements. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 21: The defendant isn't required to testify. The law expressly gives 
the defendant the privilege of not testifying if he so chooses. And if the defendant hasn't taken the 
witness stand, then you must not take that fact as any indication of guilt, nor should you indulge in 
any presumption or inference adverse to the defendant by reason thereof. The burden remains with 
the prosecution, regardless of whether the defendant testifies or not, to prove the defendant's guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 22: In determining any fact in this case, you shouldn't consider or 
be influenced by anything I've said or done that you may interpret as indicating my views thereon. 
You're the sole and final judges of all questions of fact submitted to you, and you must determine 
the facts for yourselves from the evidence, without regard to what you believe I think. I haven't 
intended to express any opinion on what the proof shows or doesn't show, or what are or what aren't 
the facts in the case. You must follow your own views and not be influenced by my views. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 23: If in these instructions any rule, direction, or idea has been stated 
in varying ways, no emphasis thereon is intended, and none must be inferred by you. For that reason, 
you're not to single out any individual point or instruction, and ignore the others; rather, you're to 
consider all the instructions as a whole, and to regard each in the light of all the others. Also, the 
order in which I've given the instructions has no significance as to their relative importance. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 24: I've tried to give you instructions embodying all of the rules of 
law that may become necessary in guiding you to a just and lawful verdict. The applicability of some 
of these instructions will depend upon the conclusions that you reach as to what the facts are. As 
to any such instruction, the fact that it has been given must not be taken as indicating an opinion by 
me that the instruction will be necessary or as to what the facts are. If an instruction applies only to 
a state of facts that you find doesn't exist, disregard the instruction. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 25: Courts of justice recognize and admit two classes of evidence, 
upon either or both of which, juries lawfully may base their findings, whether favorable to the 
prosecution or to the defendant, provided, however, that to support a verdict of guilt the evidence, 
whether of one kind or the other or a combination of both, must carry the convincing quality required 
by law. One class of evidence is known as direct and the other as circumstantial. The law makes 
no distinction between the two classes as to the degree of proof required for conviction or as to their 
effectiveness in defendant's favor, but respects each for such convincing force as it may carry and 
accepts each as a reasonable method of proof. Direct evidence of a person's conduct at any time in 
question consists of the testimony of every witness who, with any of his/her own physical senses, 
perceived such conduct or any part thereof, and which testimony describes or relates what thus was 
perceived. All other evidence admitted in the trial is circumstantial in relation to such conduct, and, 
insofar as it shows any act, statement or other conduct, or any circumstance of fact, tending to prove 
by reasonable inference the innocence or guilt of the defendant, it may be considered by you in 
arriving at a verdict. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 26: I've permitted you to take notes. Many courts don't, and a word 
of caution is in order. There's always a tendency to attach undue importance to matters that one has 
written down, but some testimony that's considered unimportant at the time presented, and thus not 
written down, takes on greater importance later in the trial in light of all the evidence presented. 
Consequently, your notes are only a tool to aid your own individual memory and you shouldn't 
compare your notes with other jurors in determining the content of any testimony or in evaluating 
the importance of any evidence. Your notes are not evidence and are by no means a complete outline 
of the proceedings or a list of the highlights of the trial. Above all, your memory should be your 
greatest asset when it comes time to deliberate and render a decision in this case. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 27: You shouldn't consider as evidence any statement of counsel 
made during the trial unless such statement was made as a stipulation conceding the existence of a 
fact or facts. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 28: To constitute the crime charged in the Information, there must 
be the joint operation of two essential elements: conduct prohibited by law and the appropriate 
culpable mental state or states with regard to the conduct prohibited by law. Before a defendant may 
be found guilty of a crime, the evidence must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant 
was prohibited from committing the conduct charged in the Inforpiation and that the defendant 
committed such conduct with the culpable mental state required foit such offense. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 29: The intent with which an act is done denotes a state of mind and 
connotes a purpose in so acting. Intent, being a state of mind, is seldom susceptible of proof by 
direct and positive evidence and may ordinarily be inferred from acts, conduct, statements, and 
circumstances. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 30: A person engages in conduct ihtentionally, or with intent, or 
willfully with respect to the nature of his conduct or to a result of his conduct when it is his 
conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result. A person engages in 
conduct knowingly or with knowledge with respect to the nature of his conduct or to circumstances 
surrounding his conduct when he is aware of the nature of his conduct or the existing circumstances. 
A person acts knowingly or with knowledge with respect to a result of his conduct when he is aware 
that his conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 31: Intent and motive should nevet be confused. Motive is what 
prompts a person to act, or fail to act. Intent refers only to the stat$ of mind with which an act is 
done or omitted. Motive is not an element of any offense, and h^nce need not be proven. The 
motive of an accused is immaterial except insofar as evidence of motive may aid in your 
determination of state of mind or intent. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 32: "On or about" includes any day that closely approximates or is 
near the day alleged in the Information. "Conduct" means an act or omission. "Act" means a 
voluntary bodily movement and includes speech. "Omission" meails a failure to act when there is 
a legal duty to act and the actor is capable of acting. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 33 
Every person, acting with the mental state required for the commission of the offense 
who directly commits the offense, who solicits, requests, commands, encourages, or 
intentionally aids another person to engage in conduct shall be criminally liable as a party for 
such conduct. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 3 d / 
In this action the only 
defendant on trial is Jesus A. Jimenez. You are not to concern yourselves with the status of the 
case against the other defendant named in this trial. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 5 ^ 
Before you can convict the defendant, Jesus A. Jimenez, of the offense of 
Criminal Homicide, Murder, as charged in Count I of the information, you must find from all of 
the evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt each and every one of the following elements of that 
offense: 
1. On or about August 15, 2007; 
2. In Salt Lake County, State of Utah; 
3. That the defendant, Jesus A. Jimenez; 
4. As a party to the offense; 
5. While in the commission, attempted commission, or immediate flight from the 
commission or altempted commission of a robbery; 
6. Caused the death of Faviola Hernandez. 
If, after careful consideration of all of the evidence in this case, you are convinced of the truth of 
each and every one of the foregoing elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find the 
defendant guilty of Criminal Homicide, Murder, as charged in the information. If, on the other 
hand, you are not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of any one or more of the foregoing 
elements, then you must find the defendant not guilty. 
INSTRUCTION NO. >^ 
Before you can convict the defendant, Jesus A. Jimenez, of (the offense of Aggravated 
Robbery, as charged in Count II of the information, you must find |rom all of the evidence and 
beyond a reasonable doubt each and every one of the following elements of that offense: 
1. On or about August 15, 2007; 
2. In Salt Lake County, State of Utah; 
3. That the defendant, Jesus A. Jimenez; 
4. As a party to the offense; 
5. Took, or, attempted to take, personal property from the person or immediate presence 
of Faviola Hernandez; and 
6. That such taking was unlawful; and 
7. That such taking was intentional; and 
8. That such taking was against the will of Faviola Hernandez; and 
9. That such taking was accomplished by means of force or fear; and 
10. That in the course of committing such taking, a dangerous weapon was used; and/or 
11 Caused the serious bodily injury to Faviola Hernandez. 
If, after careful consideration of all of the evidence in this case, you are convinced of the 
truth of each and every one of the foregoing elements beyond a rea$onable doubt, then you must 
find the defendant guilty of Aggravated Robber, as charged in the information. If, on the other 
hand, you are not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of any one or more of the foregoing 
elements, then you must find the defendant not guilty. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 3 ? -
Under Utah law, Robbery is the unlawful and intentional taking or attempted taking of 
personal property in the possession of another from his person, or immediate presence, against 
his will, accomplished by means of force or fear. A person commits Aggravated Robbery if in 
the course of committing Robbery, that person uses or threatens to use a dangerous weapon; or 
causes serious bodily injury upon another. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
You are instructed that a firearm is a dangerous weapon 
119 
INSTRUCTION NO. 3*? 
"Unlawful" means that which is contrary to law or unauthorized by law, or, without legal 
justification, or, illegal. 
"Personal property" mean anything of value, and includes money. 
INSTRUCTION NO. ^0 
An act shall be considered to be "in the course of committing a robbery" if it 
occurs in an attempt to commit, during the commission of, or inlthe immediate flight after 
the attempt or commission of a robbery. 
INSTRUCTION NO. HL 
You are instructed that under Utah law, if in the commission or furtherance of an 
Aggravated Robbery a defendant uses a dangerous weapon, he is subject to to an 
enhanced penalty. 
INSTRUCTION NO. _J^J^ 
You are instructed that if you find that the crime of Aggravated Robbery 
occurred, you must further find whether or not the defendant is subject to an enhanced 
penalty. In order to find that the defendant is subject to an enhanced penalty under Utah 
Law, you must find from all of the evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt, that: 
1. A dangerous weapon was used in the commission or furtherance of the 
Aggravated Robbery. 
If, after careful consideration of all of the evidence in this case, you are convinced 
of the truth of this element beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find the defendant 
subject to an enhanced penalty pursuant to Utah Law. If, on the other hand, you are not 
convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of the foregoing element, then you must find that 
the defendant is not subject to an enhanced penalty. 
DATED THIS J Z £ T D A Y OF JUNE, 2008 
DENO & HIN&)NANS, DlSTRTCJ^ 
M 2 5 2008 
SALT LAKE CGUN it' 
Deputy Cied 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
Jesus A. Jimenez, 
Defendant. 
VERDICT 
Case No. 071906002 
1. We, the jurors in the above case, find the defendant, Jesus A. 
Jimenez, (guilts/not guilty (circle one) of Criminal Homicide, Murder, 
a First Degree Felony, as charged in Count 1 of the Information. 
DATED this l s ^ S ^ day of O ^ R B 2008 
Bym 
mira Judicial DisMct 
JUN 2 5 2008 
SALT L£KE COUNTY 
Oil 
Deputy "« 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs, 
Jesus A. Jimenez, 
D e f e n d a n t . 
VERDICT 
Case No. 071906002 
1. We, the jurors in the above case, find the defendant, Jesus A. 
Jimenez, /guiltwnot guilty (circle one) of Aggravated Robbery, a 
First Degree Felony, as charged in Count 2 of the Information. (If 
the answer to the foregoing question is "guilty", then proceed to 2 . ) 
2. We, the jurors in the above case,! find/do not find (circle one) 
that a dangerous weapon was used in the commission or furtherance of 
the Aggravated Robbery, a First Degree Felony, charged in Count 2 of 
the Information. 
DATED t his 2 Sty day of NA>M-£T 
